Lake Chad Basin Crisis IV: Boko Haram and the climate-conflict hypothesis

Hello! This week we're going to discuss how the emergence of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin is distinctly related to water and politics. 

Boko Haram, which literally means 'western education is forbidden', emerged to prominence as an armed terrorist group in 2009 in Northern Nigeria. Over the past decade they have been responsible for the killing of thousands of innocent civilians, attacks on state security forces, and the abduction of 100s of schoolchildren. 

Boko Haram is thought to have thousands of armed fighters across Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, taking advantage of the porous borders between these countries to move freely in and around the basin (Tar & Mustapha, 2017). In response to the growing threat of Boko Haram, in 2015 the above mentioned countries formed a multi-national joint task force (MNJTF) and the Chadian and Nigerien government imposed a state of emergency (Locchi, 2020). The two countries forcibly removed citizens from the inner lake area and issued a ban on fishing activities, the sale of fuel and petrol and the export of goods to neighbouring Nigerian markets (Locchi, 2020). This was done for two reasons: To create an area in which the MNJTF could engage in armed conflict against Boko Haram without causing civilian casualties; and to halt the free movement of citizens around the lake, something that the governments thought was crucial to the success of Boko Haram. The measures displaced thousands of fishermen and farmers, forcing them to live in refugee camps and survive off humanitarian aid provisions (Locchi, 2020). This is the present humanitarian crisis that we discussed in our first Lake Chad post - thousands of farmers and fishermen interned in refugee camps and consequently unable to sustain themselves through agriculture because of the restrictions on their movement. Many have not been able to farm or fish for nearly 7 years now (Locchi, 2020).

Figure 1 Chadian army troops on an operation against Boko Haram

Figure 2 A refugee camp for displaced citizens in Borno State, Nigeria

The climate-conflict hypothesis

The relationship between climate and conflict has been well documented by scholars (Burke et al., 2015; Mach et al., 2020). We have already mentioned a few times of how climate change will increase the variability of rainfall and increase the number of extreme weather events in Sub-Saharan Africa. The combination of social unrest and declining availability of food and water resources can lessen the state or ruling authority's power which makes conflict much more likely. The declining availability of jobs, food and water may also increase looting or stealing amongst people, which will likely result in the formation of armed local or vigilante militia. The prospect of extra-state armed groups in a resource insecure region with a weakened state provides very fertile conditions for conflict. 

Scholars and NGOs alike have been quick to designate the Lake Chad Basin Crisis as a case of the climate conflict hypothesis in action. They tell a story of how declining water resources in the basin since 1960 have progressively destabilised the region to the point of open conflict between militia groups. But in my view this is a gross misrepresentation of the real political geographies of the Lake Chad Basin. In fact, I think the climate-conflict hypothesis in general is a ludicrous western imaginary of Global South politics. The theory is environmentally determinist and echoes those imperial geographies that justified the invasion and partition of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries. It seems to imagine inhabitants of the Global South as 'ants in an ant farm' who when presented with an environmental stress immediately decline into violent savages who cannot be blamed for doing anything other than forming terrorist groups and killing each other. The climate conflict hypothesis is academic colonialism - Global North white science at its finest and ignores the real political geographies of areas facing water resource variability. 

Yes, Lake Chad's decline has caused instances of conflict between farmers and fisherman as competition over the lake's resources has increased. But these conflicts are localised, ephemeral, have historical precedent, and do not explain the sudden humanitarian crisis facing the basin today. 

The measures imposed by the Nigerien and Chadian governments to combat the rise of Boko Haram have been far more instrumental in creating a humanitarian crisis than the dwindling water resources in the basin. By interning farmers and fishermen in refugee camps and restricting the movement, the authorities effectively created the crisis themselves - they have prevented people from being able to sustain themselves through agriculture. An estimated 310,000 people have died during the conflict, 90% of which is from causes related to the inability to access water and food resources.